Security Model

Eunomia is testnet-only today — do not use it with real funds. The path to mainnet is security-gated; see Roadmap for what must land first.

The model

• Non-custodial. Funds live in the owner's own contract. Eunomia code cannot move value outside the on-chain rules; violations are rejected by the contract, on-chain.
• No front-runnable initialization. Rules are set atomically in the constructor — there is no separate initialize to race.
• Checks-effects-interactions. Accounting is written before the token transfer; a failed transfer reverts the whole call. Soroban additionally forbids host-level reentrancy.
• Overflow-checked arithmetic. Spend accounting panics (reverts) rather than wrapping.
• Deliberately non-upgradeable. No upgrade entrypoint — "the rules are enforced" never degrades into "trust the admin". Exit = pause → withdraw → fresh treasury.
• Hardened ZK verifier. Proofs are bound to the owner's anchored policy and each period can attest only once (replay guard) — both covered by tests and a live replay-rejected transaction on testnet.

Audit history

Two agent-assisted internal reviews (2026-06-03 pre-ZK, and a 2026-07-07 fresh-eyes pass after M2). No critical findings; every actionable finding is closed — highlights:

Finding	Closure
Daily cap reset on UTC calendar day (2× boundary spend)	Rolling 24h window, hourly buckets
CEI ordering in pay()	Effects recorded before transfer
No owner exit if agent key lost	admin_withdraw + set_paused + set_agent
Compromised agent could lock funds in escrows	admin_cancel_escrow (owner-signed, works while paused)
Storage TTL — idle entries could archive	Every mutation auto-extends instance TTL (v3.2)
Wallet selection reset to Freighter on reload	Selected wallet persisted

The only open item is CSP/security headers on the static site (testnet demo scope).

Known limitations (honest scope)

• Session secrets live in the browser — acceptable on testnet precisely because the credential is bounded (cap + expiry + instant revoke); mainnet needs hardened key storage and fee sponsorship.
• The ZK layer attests after the fact — pay() does not yet require a proof (see Confidential compliance).
• The reputation oracle is a stand-in — scores are admin-set on testnet; production targets the stellar-8004 registries.

Reporting a vulnerability

Preferred: GitHub private vulnerability reporting on the repository (Security → Report a vulnerability), or email l3ekirerdem@gmail.com. Reports are acknowledged as fast as possible; fixes are prioritized ahead of feature work.